The paper «Collusion proof decentralized autonomous organizations» by Prof. Dr. Alexander Braun and Prof. Dr. Niklas Häusle has been published in the journal Research Policy (VHB: A, FT50).
The publication examines a central governance challenge of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs): how misconduct can be effectively sanctioned in systems without executives, formal hierarchies or enforceable property rights. DAOs commonly rely on staking mechanisms, where contributors deposit collateral that tokenholders may confiscate in cases of misconduct. However, the authors show that conventional majority voting systems can be highly vulnerable to bribery through smart contracts, allowing malicious actors to evade sanctions at very low cost.
The paper identifies several governance mechanisms that can strengthen bribery resistance in decentralized systems, including stochastic voting, masked voting, and governance structures based on sufficient size and decentralization. In addition, the study highlights the importance of long term incentives and reputational considerations for effective DAO governance.
The findings contribute to a broader understanding of how governance mechanisms in blockchain based organizations must be aligned with the actual level of decentralization and the time horizon of tokenholders.